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The design process is a central object of inquiry in design research. Many scholars have
studied designing and presented their findings in the form of models, frameworks,
and schemas. A general understanding of designing is an interesting prospect, and yet
there seem to be fewer theories about the design process achieving (or aspiring to
achieve) scientific status. In this paper, we explore possible reasons why this may be
the case. Based on ongoing research about design theories (n=175), we explore the
possibility that there are fewer scientific theories about the design process. Then, we
propose three possible arguments as to why, including: (1) Scientific theories about
designing are not useful to practitioners, (2) design research is building its own
intellectual culture, and (3) different ways of understanding scientific theories may
yield different results.
design research; design theory; research methodology; theory

1

Introduction

There are many different reasons for studying designing. Researchers may want to understand
concrete details of the design process (e.g. sketching, client interviews, and so forth). Others may
take a more practical approach with the goal being to improve design practice. Still, others may seek
a general understanding of designing. That is, they may wish to achieve a general explanation of
designing assumed to hold across a wide array of specific instances (Sutherland, 1975). Each of these
approaches has the potential to generate knowledge at higher levels of abstraction and, thus,
potentially, broader applicability to other researchers and designers in the field. Moreover, it may be
the case that each of these three approaches aspires to develop theory if theory can be understood
as a category of abstract knowledge (Höök & Löwgren, 2012) produced in a field of study.
Design research is a complex field that encompasses different approaches to inquiry. Researchers in
the field thus ascribe different values to different kinds of theory. Some researchers value scientific
theory, and others do not. Some value the possibility of making “designerly theory,” and others do
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike
4.0 International License.
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not. The kind of theory researchers value depends on many things, such as their intellectual
standpoint, and these valuations are tied to the field itself.
Any intellectual community dictates (to some extent) accepted ways of generating and contributing
knowledge, and, even in the absence of a formal “intellectual manifesto” for design research, it
would be possible to construct a sense of what these accepted ways knowledge production might be
and whether they align with the field’s overall aspirations.
In this paper, our ambition is to develop a set of arguments to account for an apparent asymmetry
between scientific and non-scientific theories about designing in the design research community.
There appears to be fewer scientific theories about designing when compared to non-scientific
theories about designing. This could mean, for instance, that researchers in the field are less
interested in developing scientific theories about designing.
During the past few years we have been engaged in a research project examining different theories,
models, and frameworks purporting to provide an explanation or description of the design process
(cf. Dubberly, 2015; Friedman, 2012; Gero & Kannengiesser, 2014; Hatchuel & Weil, 2009). As a part
of this project, we have noticed that fewer theories appear to be scientific. We have reached this
conclusion by using Karl Popper’s criterion of falsification ([1935] 2002, p. 66) to distinguish scientific
theories from other kinds and, from a collection of 175 unique theories about designing, we have
identified 25 scientific theories and 150 non-scientific theories. Confident in the potential validity of
this finding, we take it as an assumption that will frame the rest of the paper.
In the balance of this paper, we first examine different kinds of knowledge growth in intellectual
communities, and we survey examples of scientific theories of designing. Then, we briefly discuss
what non-scientific theories of designing could be. Finally, we propose three arguments as to why
there seem to be fewer attempts to develop scientific theories about designing. These include: (1)
Scientific theories about designing are not useful to practitioners, (2) design research is building its
own intellectual culture, and (3) different ways of understanding scientific theories may yield
different results.
Our hope is that these three arguments might inspire other researchers to reflect on the utility and
value of scientific theorizing with regard to designing. However, to be clear, we are not arguing that
scientific theories are better or stronger than other kinds of theory. It is obvious that different
approaches to studying the design process are able to generate abstract knowledge about designing
without leading to scientific theories. This means that scientific theorizing could thus be framed as
one relevant approach among others.

2

Cumulative and Additive Knowledge Growth

Our primary purpose in this paper is to generate explanations about why there seem to be fewer
scientific theories of the design process relative to other kinds. In the design research community,
there has been some interest in knowledge production and intellectual growth (Beck & Stolterman,
2017; Carvalho, Dong, & Maton, 2009; Dong, Maton, & Carvalho, 2014). These studies pose
interesting and important questions about how design research measures intellectual progress and
whether it is characterized by cumulative or additive knowledge growth. For our purposes, if design
is characterized primarily by additive knowledge growth, then perhaps researchers should expect to
see fewer scientific theories about designing than other kinds. But we must first clarify what we
mean when we refer to cumulative and additive knowledge growth.

2.1

Cumulative Knowledge Growth

In a cumulative growth model, new knowledge is “ranked higher” than existing knowledge because
of its greater explanatory power. This is part of what Basil Bernstein meant when he described
hierarchical knowledge growth as “motivated towards building an apex of greater integrating
propositions [with fewer and fewer axioms]” (Maton & Muller, 2006). An “apex of greater
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integrating propositions” describes propositions that explain more than their predecessors without
the need for axioms. For example, when Einstein was developing his theory of general relativity, he
had full knowledge of Newtonian mechanics. Einstein’s theory retained the explanatory power held
by mechanics, but, importantly, it explained things that Newton’s theory cannot without the need
for particular axioms. Relativity accounted for everything that scientists knew about the world and
more. In this way, it can be seen as better and more powerful.
A hierarchical structure has important implications for knowledge building. For instance, there is
probably an agreed upon, core set of problems or questions. It would seem difficult if not impossible
to converge on particular truths if all the knowledge work being done in a field addressed disparate
problems or questions. At the very least, progress would be much more incremental. In fact, quite a
few scientific disciplines have established or proposed common questions, problems, or challenges
around which to organize their intellectual resources (Beck & Stolterman, 2017). In Physics, for
example, this is apparent in a document like the ‘Oxford Questions’ (Briggs, Butterfield, & Zeilinger,
2013), which lists the “big questions” about the world that quantum physicists are trying to answer.
A hierarchical structure may also imply an agreed upon methodology for knowledge building. There
must be some consensus regarding what constitutes a novel contribution and this presumably
requires an agreed upon means of evaluating validity and relevance. But do agreed upon measures
of validity, relevance, and rigor require an agreed upon methodology of knowledge building? And
would these same requirements be in place for fields characterized by additive knowledge growth?

2.2

Additive Knowledge Growth

Additive growth is also called horizontal. In horizontal models, new knowledge is not necessarily
judged to be better or more powerful. Horizontal fields embrace a plurality of perspectives, which
may emphasize diversity and divergence of knowledge production as opposed to unity and
convergence. New knowledge in a horizontal field may provide a different perspective on a wellknown topic or it might introduce a new topic to a field. This means that, where new theories are
concerned, there is no need to address existing phenomena or even to work from common
ontological and epistemological assumptions about the world.
In a horizontal field, a researcher may have more flexibility in their choice of topic since they may
not have to demonstrate how new knowledge builds on or extends existing knowledge. In addition,
researchers working in horizontal fields may be less likely to adhere to common knowledge
production techniques. It is also possible that scholars working in horizontal fields have more
freedom to import and experiment with practices and procedures for generating knowledge, that is,
research methodology.
In distinguishing between horizontal and hierarchical knowledge growth we are not suggesting that
a given academic field exclusively adheres to one of the other. For example, while the primary
concerns in the natural sciences are universal laws, principles, and facts about natural phenomena in
the world and, thus, primarily aimed at hierarchical knowledge growth, there are aspects of it that
could rightly be interpreted as horizontal. Proposing a theory to explain some new aspects of reality
not previously known would be one example of horizontal growth in the natural sciences. And as we
discussed, there are examples of hierarchical growth in primarily horizontal fields (Chakrabarti &
Blessing, 2014).
In this paper, we take the position that knowledge growth in the design research community is
primarily horizontal. If our position is accurate, then it may account why we do not see more
scientific theories of designing. While there are design researchers working from a scientific
perspective, there are many others doing philosophical, humanistic, and designerly research.
Even if the design research community as a whole is primarily horizontal, different
“neighbourhoods” within the community could vary. For example, the “creativity neighbourhood”
might study creativity in design in terms of biological bases (scientific), discourse and power
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(humanistic), or conceptually (philosophical). In our experience working on the question of what
constitutes a design theory we have encountered (1) few theories about designing that seem to
claim scientific status and (2) few theories that aspire to scientific status. It would thus appear that
the “design process neighbourhood” is less interested in theorizing its core object in scientific ways.

3

Scientific Theories about Designing

Some design research literature (Chakrabarti & Blessing, 2014) seemingly assumes that models and
theories developed about designing are testable and refutable but we found that there had not been
much inquiry into this assumption.
Vermaas (2014) explores this idea in depth in a text on the scientific status of design research, and,
in our previous work, (Beck & Stolterman, 2015) we analyse four theories about the design process
to determine whether they could be construed as scientific in terms of Karl Popper’s famous
criterion of falsification. The theories we examine include: CK theory (Hatchuel & Weil, 2002, 2009),
the FBS framework (Gero & Kannengiesser, 2014), Figural Complexity (Schön, 1990), and Bounded
Rationality (Simon, 1969). Our aim was to use falsification as an analytical tool to determine whether
any or all of these theories could be construed as scientific. And our starting point was a simple
question: What basic statements about designing are possible to extract from C-K theory, the FBS
framework, Figural Complexity, and Bounded Rationality?
Think of a proposition as simple as “all men are mortal.” It is unfalsifiable since, according to Popper,
everywhere we look we can only find confirming evidence. No factual propositions exist that clash
with it. Factual propositions have high truth-values, where truth-values are functions of empirical
observations and mutual consensus within a community. Newtonian mechanics, for instance, had
centuries of empiricism and consensus within the scientific community. So, when Einstein proposed
his theory of relativity, it clashed with established factual propositions about the world. Moreover,
Einstein’s theory could be falsified by empirical observation. This means that it was capable of
producing basic statements, which must be “testable, inter-subjectively, by ‘observation’” (Popper,
2002). In our previous work, we were concerned with evaluating the falsifiability of a theory, and so
we extracted basic statements from each design process theory (Beck & Stolterman, 2015, pp. 5-6).
From this analysis, we synthesize several insights that we find useful for our purposes in this paper.
First, we found strong indications that there are some theories about designing that satisfy Popper’s
criterion for establishing scientific status. Second, we believe that it would be possible to develop
each of these theories by adhering to the methodological standards of science. Although we do not
spend much time elaborating this possibility, we believe that there is sufficient evidence for this kind
of scientific theory development in existing literature (Chakrabarti & Blessing, 2014). Finally, we
argue that there are fewer theories about designing developed in scientific ways.
As we have continued this project, we have collected and examined 175 theories about designing in
a similar way – using falsification as an analytical framework to extract basic statements. So far, we
have categorized 150 non-scientific theories and 25 scientific theories. This leads us to believe that
there is some validity in this paper’s framing assumption—that there are comparatively fewer
scientific theories about designing. How might we go about characterizing these other kinds?

4

Other Kinds of Theories

It may be the case that most theories about the design process are not claimed to be scientific by
their originators. Some theories are seemingly taken for granted as particular descriptions of one
design process without any intention to generalize. It seems to us that very few scholars describe or
discuss theories of the design process as though they are (or could be) scientific.
A claim to scientific status is not the same thing as scientific status. A theory may be presented as
scientific yet lack the qualities of a scientific theory. As Popper makes clear, we cannot take the word
of the theorist regarding the scientific status of a theory (2002). Similarly, theory may have scientific
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qualities even if its originators and presenters do not characterize it as such. For instance, to our
knowledge, Schön (1990) never framed figural complexity as a scientific description of the design
process. Yet, in our previous study, we analyse it in terms of falsification and argue that it could be
considered scientific on the grounds that it is possible to extract basic statements about particular
instances of designing.
There are a large number of descriptions and explanations of designing that could be interpreted as
theories. For instance, there are collections of models (Dubberly, 2015; Friedman, 2012),
frameworks (Halskov & Ebsen, 2013), and theories of designing whose authors do not present them
as fully developed, scientific explanations or descriptions of the design process.
Dubberly’s collection could be understood as schemas in the sense that they express a particular
way of thinking about designing that may serve the purpose of supporting designers in their daily
practice (Nelson & Stolterman, 2014). They have practical utility, but they do not necessarily aim to
establish any universal truth about designing.
The fact that these theories are not scientific does not mean that they cannot or should not be
engaged with and built upon in a scientific way. Nor does their intended practical utility mean that
they are actually useful to designers. Moreover, practical utility and scientific status are not mutually
exclusive. It is possible for theories about the design process to be both scientific and practically
applicable or, conversely, neither scientific nor practically applicable.
Other practice-oriented disciplines, such as education and management, value and cultivate strong
scientific theories that they believe are important and relevant to practitioners. Is design research
different? Or does it actually have a latent desire to cultivate a strong, scientific culture? If it does
have such a desire, then why are the comparatively fewer scientific theories of the design process?
And why does it seem as though there are fewer scholars calling for more scientific theories?
In the next section, we propose three potential arguments for the apparent proportion of scientific
theories about designing to other kinds of theories.

5

Three Arguments for the Presence of Scientific Theorizing in Design

So, how might we go about accounting for the presence or absence of different kinds of theories
about designing? The answer depends on our intentions. If we see the presence of scientific theories
as a problem, then we may wish to generate solutions. And, in alignment with others, our view is
that better solutions stem from “a greater number of diverse conjectures,” (Weick, 1989, p. 522).
Hence, we propose three possible conjectures as to why we observe fewer scientific theories about
designing in the design research community:
1. Design research develops theories for multiple stakeholders, and fewer stakeholders value
scientific theories.
2. Design research is building its own intellectual culture, which could involve exploring
different, culturally unique approaches to theory development.
3. Different understandings of what constitutes a scientific theory may yield different insights
about the proportion of scientific theories to other kinds.

5.1

Fewer stakeholders value scientific theories about designing.

Design research has multiple stakeholders that can be categorized into at least two groups: (1)
researchers and (2) practitioners. These groups potentially have different desires and needs when it
comes to theories about designing.
For example, researchers may be more interested in developing theories that revise or extend
established understandings of the design process, and they may also believe that it is possible to
achieve some “absolute truth” or “predictive knowledge” about the design process. By contrast,
practitioners may be more interested in developing theories about designing that are useful and
applicable in practice. Whether a theory is scientifically true may be less important to them. It may
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only be important that a theory “works” for their purposes. This means that these two groups have
different measures of success (scientific truth versus practical utility) when it comes to evaluating
theory.
Distinguishing researchers from practitioners within the design field could help make sense of the
co-presence of scientific theories and other kinds of theories. If different stakeholders in the same
field have different needs and measures of success, then it stands to reason that, in response, the
field would produce different kinds of theories. This is a simple illustration of supply and demand. It
could be argued that since there are seemingly fewer scientific theories, the demand for practical
theories applicable in the professions is greater than the demand for scientific theories.
As we have already claimed, “useful and applicable” and “scientific” are not mutually exclusive
categories when it comes to theory. A particular theory about designing may be useful, applicable,
and scientific, which is arguably the case with CK theory.
CK theory has been presented both as an ontological theory about the design process and as a more
prescriptive, applicable theory that designers might use as a framework for designing. Its originators,
Hatchuel and Weil, may have intended to develop a theory that was both useful/applicable and
scientific. However, this may be an exceptional case rather than the norm.
It could also be the case that the demand for useful/applicable theories has grown over time as
practitioners have refined their sense of what they need from a theory about designing. It is possible
that the early days of design research intended to produce more scientific theories about designing
because researchers and practitioners thought that this kind of theory would be useful. This sort of
thinking may be reflected in early attempts (e.g. during ‘the design methods movement’ of the
1960’s, which has been called the ‘design science decade’) to discover “the underlying logic” of
designing and to use this discovery to generate a universal “design method” in the style of the
scientific method. Researchers and practitioners sought, as Nigel Cross writes, “to base design
processes (as well as the products of design) on objectivity and rationality” (2001).
But it is apparent that soon after these efforts began, practitioners and researchers realized that
scientific approaches—both to designing and to studying designing—might not yield the kind of
useful results that they previously thought. Christopher Alexander famously disavowed the design
methods movement saying, “…There is so little in what is called ‘design methods’ that has anything
useful to say about how to design buildings…” (Cross, 2001).
Saying something true about designing does not necessarily mean that what is said is also useful or
applicable to practitioners. And if design is a practice-oriented discipline, then saying something
useful or applicable to practitioners is important. It makes up part of the core of the discipline—
though not the whole core. This is in contrast to a discipline like theoretical physics where the
question of “practical” utility and applicability may not make sense.
But a “practice orientation” alone does not explain the preponderance of useful, applicable theories
compared to scientific ones. There are other practice-oriented disciplines where this does not seem
to be the case. For instance, management studies has been described as practice oriented, yet its
researchers are “pushed to produce insight for both the professional and academic realms” (Corley
& Gioia, 2011). Their disciplinary norms could be said to promote and support the production of
theories that are both scientific and useful and applicable to managers and organizational
practitioners.
Moreover, Corley and Gioia (2011) have argued that management studies skews toward producing
theories—including theories about managing—that primarily aspire to scientific truth and utility.
Does design research move in a different direction? And if so, why?
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5.2

Design research is developing culturally unique approaches to theory
development.

An interesting and important theme for inquiry in the design research community has to do with
building a unique intellectual culture (Cross, 2001; Nelson & Stolterman, 2014). This initiative is
predicated on the notion that there are ways of knowing (and generating knowledge for and about
design) that are unique to design and designing.
Building this intellectual culture, which Cross has called “design as a discipline,” (2001) could
therefore be understood as an effort to cultivate “designerly” ways of knowing and theorizing rather
than importing and relying primarily on scientific ways of knowing and theorizing. This effort may
seem similar to previous attempts to develop the design version of the scientific method. But
whereas the design version of the scientific method was built around scientific values, including
objectivity and testability, the attempt to build a unique intellectual culture for design aims to
identify and cultivate designerly values.
This may complicate our previous division of the multiple stakeholders of design research. We
divided them into two groups: researchers and practitioners. And we discussed how shifting needs
and desires of practitioners may account for the proportion of scientific theories to other kinds of
theories about designing. But now it becomes possible to speculate about researchers themselves
experiencing a shift in needs and/or desires when it comes to theories about designing. For example,
there are a growing number of researchers in the field conducting research through design — an
approach that utilizes design methods and processes as a legitimate means of inquiry (Zimmerman,
Stolterman, & Forlizzi, 2010).
Theories with strong scientific utility can be seen as (1) advancing knowledge and (2) guiding its
production; that is, helping researchers identify what to study as well as how to study it. But if a
researcher does not intend to study something in a scientific way, or if they complement scientific
research with research through design, then perhaps other kinds of theory are necessary. A scientific
theory may not be the appropriate tool for guiding concept generation or for judging whether a
concept is a good fit (or not) for a given design brief.
Researchers using design methods and processes may find—as some practitioners did—that
scientific theories about designing are useful or applicable in some ways but not others. They may
therefore share in the demand for other kinds of theories. And it would thus make some sense that
researchers using design methods and processes would intend or present their theories about
designing not as scientific or having scientific aspirations but as practical and useful. While these
kinds of theories have the potential to contribute to a general understanding of designing, their
purpose is not to present a “true,” scientific account of it. Rather, their purpose can be understood
as strengthening researchers’ ability to design and conduct research through design.
It is also possible that research through design can produce theories about designing in the form of
frameworks and methods that are useful and applicable. This illustrates a relationship between a
particular research approach and its theoretical output. Simply put, the way researchers think about
theory affects the theory they produce (Galle, 2011) and there are many ways to think about theory.
But while this explanation may account for the presence of non-scientific theories about designing,
by itself it might not account for the ratio of scientific theories to other kinds. There are some
researchers using design methods and practices in their work, but research through design still
seems to be a peripheral approach in the design disciplines despite strong arguments for its
legitimacy (Gaver, 2012; Zimmerman, Stolterman, & Forlizzi, 2010).
The potentially evolving needs and desires of researchers in concert with a broader effort to build a
unique intellectual culture for design may contribute to the proliferation of other kinds of theories
and theoretical knowledge objects such as annotated portfolios (Bowers, 2012; Löwgren, 2013),
strong concepts (Höök & Löwgren, 2012), bridging concepts (Dalsgaard & Dindler, 2014), and generic
316

design thinking (Wiberg & Stolterman, 2014). Taken together, these phenomena may contribute to a
decline in the development of scientific theories about designing.

5.3

There are different ways to distinguish scientific theories from other kinds

Our third argument is based on the premise that what is understood as scientific is more complex
than any single framework implies. For example, in our ongoing work, we have primarily used Karl
Popper’s influential concept of falsification to distinguish scientific theories from other kinds, but
there are other ways that we could go about doing this.
When a researcher articulates a particular conceptual framework, then that framework shapes their
analysis and findings. Frameworks are like lenses that can be changed out to reveal different aspects
of the world. Using Popper’s criterion of falsifiability as an analytical framework to distinguish
scientific theories from other kinds thus becomes one way of seeing the interplay between different
kinds of theories in the design research community. It appears there are fewer scientific theories
about designing, but from a different perspective this appearance may change.
The question is not whether one of these perspectives is the “one true” perspective. Rather, the
question(s) are how these different perspectives might complement one another and how they
enrich each other in the service of deepening our understanding of designing. This means that we
need to ask ourselves: What does falsifiability reveal that other analytical frameworks do not? How
do other frameworks challenge and strengthen the way we understand design theories vis-a-vis
falsifiability? And would a change of framework change our perception that there are fewer
scientific theories?
Since there are multiple perspectives on the nature of scientific theories, it becomes important to
develop a rationale for choosing falsifiability. What are our reasons for choosing falsifiability? Are
they good?
Falsifiability strikes us as a rational way to enter the conversation on the possibility of scientific
design theories given that other scholars in the field appear to view falsifiability as a valid, useful
framework (Vermaas, 2014). Moreover, when we began our research, we had not yet encountered
other scholarship using falsifiability to analyse different theories about designing. This means that
existing interest in the field combined with a novel application of Popper’s framework motivated the
early stages of our work.
It is also possible to interpret falsifiability and critique, which is a crucial aspect of design culture, as
neighbouring concepts. Scientists attempt to falsify scientific theories (in order to test their
strength), which is similar to the way designers convene juries to critique (test the strength of)
design work. Hence, another possible reason to choose falsifiability as an analytical framework is its
resonance with design culture.
However, as we have continued our research, we have realized that, if our goal is to contribute
deeper understandings of design to the research community, then there is a need to consider
different ways of understanding scientific theories. For instance, the received view (Suppe, 1998)
and semantic view (Halvorson, 2011) of scientific theories have been widely discussed and debated.
It would be possible to build on our previous work and use these ways of interpreting scientific
theories to assess different design theories. It would also be possible to replicate our approach in
this paper and examine a large collection of theories to see whether the proportion of scientific
theories about designing remains the same.

6

Conclusion

If design research is primarily characterized by horizontal knowledge growth, then it stands to
reason that there will be scientific theories about designing alongside other kinds of theories about
designing. However, the horizontal structure does not account for the proportion of scientific
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theories to these other kinds. Nor does it present a clear picture of the epistemological values held
by researchers in the field.
Our starting assumption – grounded in on-going empirical work – in this paper is that there are
fewer scientific theories that explain or describe the design process than other kinds. We discussed
one way to distinguish scientific theories by drawing on a discourse from the philosophy of science,
and we contribute three possible explanations regarding why there seem to be fewer scientific
theories about designing in design research when compared to other kinds:
1. Scientific theories about designing are not useful to practitioners,
2. Design research is building its own intellectual culture, and
3. Different ways of understanding scientific theories may yield different results
For each of these explanations, we also describe possible consequences for the field, including: (1) a
decreasing ratio of scientific theories to other kinds, (2) developing more designerly ways of
understanding of theories and theorizing, and (3) reflecting on the philosophical views that one
adopts when building and studying theories about designing.
Theory construction and theory use have been addressed in the field in different ways (Friedman,
2003; Gregor & Jones, 2007; Redström, 2017). And there is a growing discourse around the
possibility of scientific theories about designing (Beck & Stolterman, 2015; Vermaas, 2014). In this
paper, we assume that scientific theories about designing are possible and in existence today and
that there are fewer scientific theories about designing relative to other kinds in the design research
community.
We offer our three arguments as steps towards a more robust picture of the intellectual culture
within design research. Individually, each explanation points toward future questions for inquiry,
such as: How do design researchers account for or address multiple stakeholders in their
publications and presentations? What is the current state of the effort to build a unique intellectual
culture for design research? How and why do design researchers choose between different,
potentially competing philosophical views to inform their work?
As we have stated, this paper is not necessarily a call for more scientific theorizing of the design
process. It is an examination of the presence and proportion of scientific theories in relation to other
kinds. Based on our conclusions, we argue that design research would benefit from a more focused
debate about the overall need for design process theories. Is there is a need for scientific theories?
Or is there more interest in developing designerly theories? When a field produces multiple theories
of different kinds about the same phenomenon, an examination of the presence and proportion of
different kinds of theory can lead to insights about what kinds of theories the field values, how these
values have changed over time, and potential directions in which these values are moving.

7
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